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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from a final Order (Summary Judgment) of 
the Seventh District Court of San Juan County, State of Utah 
(Honorable Bryce K. Bryner). Everett Thomas, the plaintiff-
appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j). The Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), "poured" 
this Appeal "over" to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
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• STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented by this Appeal is whether the 
District Court committed reversible error by determining that 
defendant-appellee Board of Education of the San Juan School 
District ("the District") owed no duty of care to Mr. Thomas 
and by, accordingly, granting the District's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
(STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
Summary Judgment should be affirmed only if there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court 
reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. 
E.g., Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993). 
The appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling 
1 
on appeal of a grant of summary judgment. E.g., Cannon v. 
University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993). On 
review of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Id. 
(ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT) 
This issue was preserved in the District Court by 
Mr. Thomas's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. at 181-254) and at oral argument, 
presented January 29, 1999, in opposition to that Motion. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
This is a significant personal (burn) injury case, in 
which Mr. Thomas seeks substantial monetary compensation, f 
the damages he has sustained and will sustain as proximate 
results of the alleged negligence of the District (by and 
through one or more of its employees) in connection with a 
fire that occurred, on May 24, 1994, in a vehicle (a 1984 
Chevrolet Suburban) owned and operated by the District, at 
Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") Boarding School in Aneth, 
Utah. 
2 
Mr. Thomas alleged (and continues to contend) that the 
District breached, in several alternative respects, its duty 
of care to him and that the District's breach or breaches 
proximately caused him to sustain damages. After discovery 
had been completed and when the scheduled trial-commencement 
date was approaching, the District moved for Summary Judgment 
and submitted its Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. at 
137-68), contending that it owed Mr. Thomas no duty of care 
that it could conceivably have breached. Mr. Thomas submitted 
his Memorandum in Opposition to the District's Motion. R. at 
181-254. The District submitted its Reply Memorandum in 
support of that Motion. R. at 262-68. 
On January 29, 1999, Judge Bryner heard oral arguments on 
the Motion and took that Motion under advisement. On 
February 1, 1999, Judge Bryner rendered his "Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," R. at 269-71, 
determining that the District was entitled to Summary Judgment 
on the basis that it owed no duty of care to Mr. Thomas, and 
directing counsel for the District to prepare an appropriate 
formal order. On February 25, 1999, Judge Bryner entered the 
Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 272-
75. On March 16, 1999, Mr. Thomas filed, in the Seventh 
District Court, his Notice of Appeal from that Order. R. at 
3 
284-85. That Notice was filed in the Utah Supreme Court on 
March 18, 1999. On June 23, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this Appeal to this Court. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At the time of the accident, Mr. Thomas was a 
teacher at the BIA school in Aneth. Deposition of Everett 
Thomas, at 10 (R. at 160). 
2. Ms. Robin Benallie, a teacher-employee of the 
District, had driven a group of her students to the BIA 
School, in the subject Suburban, to put on a play. Deposition 
of Robin Benallie at 4, 5, 8 (R. at 149-51); Deposition of 
Robert Sanders (the District's resident automotive expert 
employee) at 34 (R. at 157). 
3. After completing their performance, 
Ms. Benallie and the students loaded the Suburban for their 
return trip, but the car wouldn't start. Benallie depo. at 
42-43 (R. at 152-53). 
4. The subject Suburban had a history, known to 
the District, through its agents, of a specific mechanical 
problem, to wit: it would "vapor lock," rendering it 
temporarily incapable of being operated after the time that 
condition manifested itself. E.g., deposition of James A. 
Haws (another District employee knowledgeable regarding 
4 
automotive issues) at 3; 6-10; 13-15; 18-19; 21-23; 26-27; 38-
39; 44 (R. at 196-202; 204-05); Sanders depo. at 3; 11-12; 17-
23; 28-29 (R. at 213-14; 216-19). 
5. The District, through its agents, allowed 
another of its agents, Ms. Benallie, to take the Suburban on 
the subject trip even though defendant knew of the likelihood 
that it would "vapor lock" during the subject trip. Haws 
depo. at 40-41; 59 (R. at 204-05; 208); Sanders depo. at 13; 
28; 36 (R. at 215; 218; 220). 
6. Ms. Benallie herself, although she is not 
mechanically inclined (Benallie depo. at 24-26; 28; 66-68 (R. 
at 230-31; 233)), and although she testified that the term 
"vapor lock" meant nothing to her (Benallie depo. At 71 (R. at 
234)), knew that defendant had concerns about the wisdom of 
her taking the Suburban on the subject trip. Benallie depo. 
at 31 (R. at 232). 
7. The District knew, through its agents, of the 
foreseeablility of safety risks, specific and general, 
associated with the Suburban's "vapor lock" condition. E.g., 
Sanders depo. at 36; 38-39; 45-47 (R. at 220-21; 223). 
8. The reason that the Suburban wouldn't start, in 
connection with the subject incident, was that it had "vapor 
5 
locked." Haws depo. at 51 (R. at 207); Sanders depo. at 36; 
45 (R. at 220; 223). 
9. Ms. Benallie was herself concerned, while 
Mr. Thomas was in the process, in her presence, of trying to 
get the engine started, with the dangerousness of the 
situation. Benallie depo. at 67-68 (R. at 233) . 
10. A short while before the fire occurred, 
Ms. Benallie approached Starr Ebert, a maintenance man at the 
BIA Boarding School, told him that the Suburban would not 
start, and asked him for help. Affidavit of Starr Ebert, 
para. 3 (R. at 256). 
11. Either Ms. Benallie gave Mr. Ebert the keys to 
the Suburban or they were already in the Suburban. Id., para. 
4. 
12. Mr. Ebert and a co-employee then tried to start 
the engine, while Ms. Benallie was back inside the school 
building, by pouring gasoline from a coffee can into the 
carburetor, in a fashion that Mr. Ebert did not think was 
dangerous and in which he had started other vehicles. Id., 
paras. 5-8. 
13. Mr. Thomas, who arrived on the scene about the 
time Ms. Benallie emerged from the school building, tried to 
help with the starting of the engine in the same fashion that 
6 
Mr. Ebert and his co-employee had been pursuing. Affidavit of 
Starr Ebert, paras. 9, 12 (R. at 256-57). 
14. Mr. Thomas poured gasoline on the carburetor 
while Mr. Ebert turned the ignition. Thomas depo. at 24; 30 
(R. at 163; 166). 
15. On Mr. Thomas's third attempt to start the car 
in that fashion, flames erupted from the engine compartment, 
burning Mr. Thomas and Ms. Benallie. Thomas depo. at 30; 31 
(R. at 166-67); Benallie depo. at 50 (R. at 154). 
16. Mr. Thomas had previously started a car by 
pouring gas on the carburetor. Thomas depo. at 26 (R. at 
164) . 
17. Prior to the accident, Mr. Thomas knew there 
was a potential risk involved in trying to start a car by 
pouring gas on the carburetor. Thomas depo. at 31-32 (R. at 
167-68). 
18. Although she had been instructed, prior to the 
commencement of the trip to Aneth, to let the engine cool off, 
before trying to restart it (Sanders depo. at 36-37; 43-44; 
53-54; 56 (R. at 220-22; 224)) and, after the problem re-
manifested itself, to let the engine cool off for two or three 
hours and to lock the Suburban up and bring the keys back to 
the school (Haws depo. at 24-26; 45-46; Ex. 1 to Haws depo. 
7 
(R. at 201-02; 206; 210)), Ms. Benallie did not give any 
instructions to anyone and did not try to stop Mr. Thomas, or 
anyone else, from trying to start the engine in the way being 
attempted by Mr. Ebert, his co-employee, and Mr. Thomas. 
Ebert Aff. paras. 11, 12 (R. at 256-57); Thomas depo. at 27; 
56 (R. at 243-44). 
19. A vehicle owned by the District that had any 
possible safety problems should not have been driven and 
should have been taken out of service. Deposition of Ronald 
Barlow (former principal of the District's Whitehorse High 
School - the facility from which the Suburban's ill-fated trip 
began) at 6; 16; 40 (R. at 248-250)). 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary Judgment is generally inappropriate in negligence 
cases. This case presents no exception to that general rule. 
The District owed Mr. Thomas a duty of care, and significant 
triable questions of fact remain for jury determination. 
The District had a duty of care, to a reasonably 
foreseeable universe of persons, including Mr. Thomas, to 
maintain the Suburban in a reasonably safe condition, even if 
Ms. Benallie had not requested help and even if she had not 
been present while the incident was occurring. 
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The District owed Mr. Thomas a particular duty of care by 
reason of Ms. Benallie's requesting help and knowingly 
allowing Mr. Thomas to perform dangerous work on a vehicle 
that the District knew was in unsafe mechanical condition when 
it left on the subject trip. 
The District also owed Mr. Thomas a duty of care 
satisfactorily to train and supervise its employees. 
This Court should reverse the District Court and remand 
this case for trial. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GENERALLY INAPPROPRIATE IN 
NEGLIGENCE CASES. THIS CASE IS NO EXCEPTION. 
It is well settled that the question of negligence is 
ordinarily one of fact for the jury, and that summary judgment 
is appropriate only in clear-cut cases. See Hunt v. Hurst, 
785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990). See, also, English v. Kienke, 
774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App. 1989) (summary judgment should 
be granted with great caution when negligence is alleged; 
summary judgment is reversed for only the most clear-cut 
negligence cases); Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 
821, 825 (Utah App. 1989) (as a general proposition, summary 
judgment is inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its 
merits). 
9 
It is also universally held that proximate cause is a 
factual issue which in most cases may not appropriately be 
resolved on a motion for summary judgment. See Apache Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); Unigard 
Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Utah 1984). 
The law recognizes a party's entitlement to having the 
trier (s) of fact decide a party's claims unless it appears 
that, even upon the facts claimed by that party, he or she 
could not establish a basis for recovery. "When there is 
doubt about the matter, it should be resolved in favor of 
permitting the party to go to trial." Id. (Emphasis added.) 
There may be more than one proximate cause of the same 
injury or damages. If the negligence of two or more persons 
combines to produce an injury, and the negligence of each of 
them is a proximate cause of the injury, then those persons 
must share liability for the resulting injury and damages, in 
proportion to their respective shares of fault. Anderson v. 
Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 647 P.2d 45 
(1970); Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 154, 449 P.2d 996 (1969); 
Jacques v. Farrimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133 (1963). 
The District had, as will be explained below, a duty of 
care to Mr. Thomas. The fact that a jury might well determine 
that Mr. Thomas was, despite his good intentions, negligent 
10 
and that that negligence was a legal cause of his significant 
burn injuries is not, under the relevant statutory scheme 
(Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43), the end of the inquiry. 
For a jury might also reasonably determine that the District 
had substantial causal fault for failing to take reasonable 
steps to make the Suburban safe; for allowing it to be 
operated in remote areas of the State in an unsafe condition; 
for Ms. Benallie's allowing (after the District had put things 
in motion) Mr. Thomas to do what he did; and/or for the 
District's failure adequately to train and/or supervise its 
employees. 
This is simply not a case in which summary judgment was 
appropriately granted. 
B. THE DISTRICT HAD A DUTY THAT RAN TO MR. THOMAS TO 
KEEP THE SUBURBAN IN GOOD AND SAFE OPERATING 
CONDITION, A DUTY THAT RAN TO MR. THOMAS BY REASON 
OF MS. BENALLIE'S ACTS AND OMISSIONS IN LIGHT OF HER 
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION, AND A DUTY THAT 
RAN TO MR. THOMAS SATISFACTORILY TO TRAIN AND 
SUPERVISE ITS EMPLOYEES. 
It is beyond question that the District, as the owner and 
operator of the Suburban (e.g., Sanders depo. at 58 (R. at 
225); Benallie depo. at 17-18 (R. at 229)), had the legal duty 
to maintain that vehicle in good and safe operating condition. 
Section 307 of the Restatement, Second, of Torts, provides: 
It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether 
a human being or thing, which the actor knows or 
11 
should know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or 
defective, that its use involves an unreasonable 
risk of harm to others. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It has been held, specific to the automobile context, 
that the owner of a vehicle may be held liable to a third 
person for personal injuries caused by a defective condition 
of which the owner had or should have had knowledge. E.g., 
Murry v. Advanced Asphalt Co., 751 P.2d 209 (Okla. App. 1987); 
Bush v. Middleton, 304 P.2d 474, 475 (Okla. 1975). It has 
also been held, under traditional negligence concepts, that an 
owner's knowledge, actual or constructive, of a defective 
condition of a thing that he, she, or it owns, gives rise to 
the duty to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious 
consequences resulting from such a condition. E.g., Kent v. 
Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 S.2d 493, 497 (La. 1982). 
The duty in question is to anyone who might foreseeably1 
be endangered by a breach of that duty. It is, at a bare 
1
 One fact apparently overlooked by Judge Bryner should be kept 
squarely in mind by this Court. Of apparently considerable 
significance to Judge Bryner's Ruling was the proposition (R. 
at 271) that "it was not foreseeable that the Plaintiff would 
voluntarily attempt to assist the Defendant by pouring 
gasoline in the carburetor...." The problem with the "non-
foreseeability" conclusion is not only that the record belies 
(see record citations set forth in Fact No. 7 (supra), p. 5), 
as even a general matter, that conclusion. Judge Bryner 
appears clearly to have overlooked the fact that Mr. Thomas 
was doing what he was doing before the very eyes of 
12 
minimum, a matter of triable fact that the District breached 
that duty; and that duty has nothing to do with the "special 
relationship" tangent off on which the District will (based on 
the approach taken by the District in the District Court 
proceedings) contend this Court's analysis should go.2 
As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, in Hoffman v. 
Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, "the doctrine of 
foreseeability is used in tort law to establish the scope of 
the duty of a person to exercise reasonable care to avoid 
harming others." Id. at 416 (emphasis added). Courts take a 
broad view of the class of risks and the class of victims who 
Ms. Benallie, a District agent, just as those chargeable with 
maintaining the Suburban were District agents. A conclusion 
of "non-foreseeability," in this factual context, is clearly 
erroneous. 
2Mr. Thomas submits that the fact situation here, in light of 
the District's allowing the unsafely maintained Suburban to 
travel the roadways of San Juan County and in light of 
Ms. Benallie's conduct (she requested help and stood by while 
something she knew to be dangerous was occurring), amounts 
even more clearly to a duty to Mr. Thomas, and a possible 
breach thereof, than the example set forth in the following 
Illustration 3 of Comment d to Section 314 of the Restatement, 
Second, of Torts: 
A, a trespasser in the freight yard of the B Railroad 
Company, falls in the path of a slowly moving train. The 
conductor of the train sees A, and by signalling the 
engineer could readily stop the train in time to prevent 
its running over A, but does not do so. While a 
bystander would not be liable to A for refusing to give a 
signal, the B Railroad is subject to liability for 
13 
are foreseeable for the purpose of the existence of a duty of 
care. E.g., Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 898 P.2d 
1000, 1002 (Az. App. 1995). And there is no requirement that 
a foreseeable plaintiff must be connected with or personally 
known to a defendant for a duty to exist. E.g., Alhambra 
School District v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 470 (1990). In 
determining whether a defendant in a negligence case owes a 
duty to a plaintiff, an important consideration is 
foreseeability; and, as a general rule, 
... a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who 
are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with 
respect to all risks which make the conduct 
unreasonably dangerous. 
Blaine v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 850 P.2d 346, 348 (Okla. 
App. 1992) (quoting from Wofford v. Eastern Estate Hospital, 
795 P.2d 516, 519 (Okla. 1990)) (emphasis added). 
Application of this foreseeability analysis should have 
worked to defeat the District's Motion even if Ms. Benallie 
had not been present when the incident occurred. It follows, 
a fortiori, that the District's duty to Mr. Thomas, on the 
uncontested facts of this case, has been clearly established. 
Alternatively and if the Court somehow determines that a 
"special relationship" analysis should be undertaken, it 
permitting the train to continue in motion with knowledge 
of A's peril. 
14 
should be noted that Ms. Benallie (an employee and agent of 
the District) having asked for help (Ebert Aff., para. 3 (R. 
at 256)), assumed responsibility for the safety of Mr. Thomas 
when she stood by, without doing anything to try to stop 
Mr. Thomas, despite having received instructions essentially 
to the contrary from Mr. Haws: 
... we will ... find 'a special relationship and 
consequent duty when a defendant knew of the likely 
danger to an individual or distinct group of 
individuals or when a defendant should have known of 
such danger,' [Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231, 240 (Utah 1993)] 
Drysdale v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1994). 
Also (and although the Court likely does not need to 
reach the issue), it is also beyond dispute that an employer, 
such as the defendant in this case, has the duty to supervise 
its employees {e.g., J.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 
124 (Utah 1992); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 
1059 (Utah 1992)), such as Ms. Benallie, the mechanically 
unschooled person who was driving the Suburban full of 
schoolchildren, who asked for help, and who, as a matter of 
triable fact, stood mute and passive -- even after having been 
given instructions essentially to the contrary. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Mr. Thomas urges the Court to recognize that the no-duty 
argument, the only argument advanced by the District and the 
15 
only basis on which the District Court granted Summary 
Judgment, is one that should, in the instant context, be 
rejected. It is well established, "black-letter" law that 
negligence can lie in acting or omitting to act, and the 
District's failures here are much more akin, for example, to 
the longstanding failure of a store owner with actual 
knowledge of the presence of a dangerous condition afoot on 
its premises to take action to address that condition (a 
clearly actionable omission, with respect to any user of its 
premises), or, for example, to that of an automobile operator 
who carelessly omits to move his vehicle from the middle of an 
intersection, than it is to no-duty "special relationship" 
situations whose significant factual scenarios start, and end, 
with a simple failure to act when no pre-existing duty exists. 
And, as the District candidly recognized, near the top of page 
5 of the initial Memorandum it submitted in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 143) in the District Court 
proceedings, "[a]ny inferences to be drawn from the underlying 
facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion." 
Mr. Thomas, a severely burn-injured, foreseeable (and, by 
Ms. Benallie, actually "seen") "good Samaritan" on the 
uncontested facts of this case, urges this Court, by reason of 
16 
the foregoing analysis, in light of the general proposition 
that any doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing 
litigants to have their claims resolved by juries, and in the 
interest of justice, to reverse the District Court and remand 
this action for trial. 
Respectfully submit ted this ^ 
-tfc 
day of August, 1999, 
PETER C. CO~LLINS 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
ERIC P. SWENSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant, Everett Thomas 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the b day of August, 1999, 
I caused to be served two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT EVERETT THOMAS 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Brent A. Burnett 
Barbara E. Ochoa 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham (A1231) 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Post Office Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
HAND DELIVERY 
/ U.S. MAIL 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
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ADDENDUM 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
RLEL
' FEB - 3 1999 
OLCIKK OF THE COURT ~ fJ^ 
BY. , ,._ y 
DEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EVERETT THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
SAN JUAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
: RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
: FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Case No. 9607-50 
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to which the 
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Objection. Oral argument was heard 
on January 29, 1999. The Court took the matter under advisement 
and now issues this ruling. 
Defendant contends that it did not owe a duty of due care to 
the Plaintiff at the time of his accident, and that he therefore 
cannot establish a claim for negligence against the Defendant. The 
Plaintiff responds that the Defendant did owe the Plaintiff a duty 
of due care. 
Although the Court finds that the Plaintiff owed a duty of due 
care to properly maintain the 1984 Suburban, the Court finds that 
the Plaintiff does not fall within the ambit of those persons to 
whim the duty was owed. The 1984 Suburban was disabled in a 
parking lot, allegedly with "vapor lock," when the Plaintiff 
offered to help without being asked by Defendant or any of its 
agents. The Court cannot find, on the basis of the record, that 
0001 
2 
the Defendant, through any of its agents, including Ms. Benallie, 
assumed responsibility for the safety of the Plaintiff who was a 
"volunteer." Under the circumstances of this case, there were no 
"special relationships" existing between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant as discussed in Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 312 
(Utah 1986) at 415, that would impose a duty to protect the 
Plaintiff. 
The Court also finds that it was not foreseeable that the 
Plaintiff would voluntarily attempt to assist the Defendant by 
pouring gasoline in the carburetor with the attendant injury. 
Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not within the scope of those 
persons to whom the duty was owed. 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate 
summary judgment. * 
DATED this J_ day of February, 1999. 
0002 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / day of February, 1999, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Peter C. Collins 
James E. Morton 
Attorneys at Law 
4021 South 700 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Eric P. Swenson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Barbara E. Ochoa 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
L 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
individuals needing special accommodations (including 
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding 
should call 1-800-992-1072, at least THREE working 
days prior to the scheduled proceeding. 
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